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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Overview  
The goal of this study was to investigate a new type of semantic influence in word 
recognition – specifically, whether there is a behavioral difference in the recognition of spoken 
social words when compared to non-social words, in speed of recognition and accuracy.  
Semantics is a topic of growing interest in psycholinguistics overall (e.g., Forster, & Hector, 
2002; Landauer, & Dumais, 1997), and in the study of spoken word recognition.  Research has 
shown that some semantic characteristics of words can influence word recognition.  For 
example, concreteness and imageability have been shown to influence response times in tasks 
considered to be measures of online lexical retrieval (for a review see Tyler, Moss, Galpin, & 
Voice, 2002).  The presence of semantic effects in word recognition supports the notion that 
recognition is an interactive process in which higher level cognition can influence lower level 
perception.  The current study is an investigation into a new semantic effect in word recognition 
– social bias – and whether word recognition shows some dependency upon the sociality of a 
word's referent, with the goal of uncovering elements of semantic structure in the mental lexicon. 
By social bias, I mean the relevance of a word’s referent in a social context.  I refer to 
this concept as sociality – higher sociality means more relevance in a social context.  The goal of 
the study was to investigate whether sociality affects visual and auditory word recognition. 
A Brief Review of Semantic Effects in Word Recognition 
 The two most studied semantic variables in word recognition research are concreteness 
and imageability.  Concreteness is highly correlated with imageability and both are often used 
interchangeably (although Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan [1968] observed that emotion words may 
be rated high on imageability but low on concreteness, while the opposite may be true for 
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infrequently encountered nouns).  Imageability has been shown to influence several stages of 
language production and comprehension (e.g., Bird, Howard, & Franklin, 2003).  Concreteness 
effects have been primary demonstrated in visual word recognition tasks (e.g, Strain, Patterson, 
& Seidenberg, 1995; Strain & Herdman, 1999).  There is ample evidence suggesting that 
language production and recognition processes confer a benefit to concrete words, especially 
when the process of recognition is slowed or difficult to resolve.  This is one of the most striking 
examples of a word’s semantics influencing how it is perceived; another example is polysemy, or 
the number of meanings associated with a word (e.g., Rodd, Gaskell & Marslen-Wilson, 2002), 
which, while having a more complicated relationship with recognition performance, also is 
frequently cited as a perceptual semantic effect. 
 Along these lines, Wurm and Vakoch (1996; Vakoch & Wurm, 1997) looked at three 
dimensions of meaning that are prevalent in several areas of psychology: Evaluation (how good 
or bad something is), potency (how strong or weak something is), and activity (how fast or slow 
something is).  These scales were taken from Osgood’s (1957) multidimensional scaling research 
and have been shown to be useful in characterizing stimuli in a number of domains.  They were 
selected by the authors because they describe behaviorally important aspects of stimuli.  
Together, the authors surmised, they capture the value and threat of a stimulus, which affect both 
decision-making and emotional responses.  Wurm and Vakoch (1996) assessed the influence of 
these three dimensions on lexical decision times for emotion words, and found that low 
evaluation, high potency, and high activity were associated with the fastest responses, suggesting 
that word recognition is sensitive to the adaptive motivation of avoiding danger.  In a second 
study, Vakoch and Wurm (1997) used a more general sample of words and observed an opposite 
evaluation effect, with good words being responded to in a lexical decision task faster than bad 
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words.  The authors concluded that emotion words and words in general may be processed 
differently.  A more recent study using these three dimensions (Wurm, Vakoch, & Seaman, 
2004) confirmed these results using the naming task, which is seen as less contaminated by non-
perceptual processes.  Together, these studies show that behaviorally-relevant variables seem to 
have some role in auditory recognition processes. 
 Wurm and Vakoch (2000) followed up this line of research by investigating additional 
behaviorally-relevant semantic variables.  The authors asked subjects to rate 100 common nouns 
on danger and usefulness.  These ratings predicted reaction times in a lexical decision task, even 
after controlling for frequency, length, neighborhood size, concreteness, and animacy of the 
referent.  Higher ratings on both dimensions were associated with faster lexical decisions.  
Additionally, an interaction between the two was observed, with the effect of usefulness 
depending on the value of danger; words with high danger ratings were associated with slower 
responses as usefulness increased.  The authors concluded that useful things that are not 
dangerous are unambiguously desirable, and can be responded to quickly.  However, things that 
are both dangerous and useful cause a conflict, which negates or reverses the usefulness 
advantage.  This effect was also investigated using the naming task (Wurm et al., 2003).  Again, 
facilitative main effects were observed for danger and usefulness.  However, there was not a 
significant interaction.  Wurm and Seaman (2008) followed this up with a series of tasks – 
including delayed naming and perceptual identification – designed to assess the effects of these 
variables under different conditions.  They observed little evidence for a post-perceptual bias 
explanation for danger and usefulness, while seeing a strong predictive interaction between the 
two in both naming and perceptual identification.  The authors concluded that these behaviorally-
relevant variables do indeed appear to be perceptual, providing further evidence that 
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behaviorally-relevant semantic structure can be investigated via word recognition paradigms.  It 
is these findings that motivated the use of word recognition tools to uncover evidence for social 
semantic structure in the lexicon. 
Theoretical Semantics and Embodied Cognition 
Theoretical Semantics: Features and Multidimensional Space 
 Before describing the current study, I’ll briefly outline several theories of semantics that 
have some bearing on incorporating semantics into word recognition, before tying these theories 
to social psychology.  First, it should be noted that by “semantics” I am referring to the 
properties of words that are not captured by syntax or “traditional” psycholinguistic measures, 
such as frequency, or form-based characteristics.  Many of the variables described thus far – 
concreteness, danger, usefulness, and the to-be-discussed sociality – may appear more pragmatic 
in nature, but fall under the umbrella of “semantics” when discussed in terms of word 
recognition. 
 Many treatments of semantics (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1980) propose that meaning is 
composed of semantic features or primitives.  Features have been obtained in norming studies 
(e.g., Battig & Montague, 1969; McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997), where subjects list features 
of things or concepts and the most frequent responses are inferred as semantic components.  In a 
compositional model, a single lexical item is mapped onto many features or primitives which are 
shared for all entries in the lexicon.  Semantic features represent the core of most psychological 
and linguistic approaches to the representation of meaning.  In concepts research, features, also 
referred to as primitives and attributes, have historically been the basis of representation in 
probabilistic models of meaning.  Rosch (1978) describes objects as bundles of perceptual and 
functional attributes, and claimed that there exist natural discontinuities where cuts in 
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categorization can be made to define attributes.  For cognitive economy, all objects share a 
common pool of attributes.  In Rumelhart and Norman's (1975) Active Structural Network model 
of semantic representation, features are nodes that are accessed via a natural language 
vocabulary.  This is concordant with many linguistic natural language approaches to semantics 
(e.g., Wierzbicka, 1980) that posit the meaning of a word as a constellation of primitive words.  
The feature norming task, where subjects are asked to provide lists of features of category 
concepts, creates natural language schemata that are probabilistically weighted by frequency of 
feature endorsement.   
 McRae et al. (1997) showed that subjects were sensitive to these feature frequencies in 
rating tasks where stimuli were primed by words whose semantic relatedness was measured in 
feature overlap.  Subjects were asked to rate the animacy, concreteness, artificiality, and growth 
of nouns after being presented a prime noun that had a variable degree of relatedness to the 
target.  Greater feature overlap facilitated responding, which was taken as evidence for a network 
model of semantics where features are shared among lexical entries and access to features is 
dependent upon resting activation levels.  In such a model, sociality would not necessarily 
represent a single primitive, but aspects of sociality may. 
 A modern approach to semantics involves conceptualizing meaning in high-dimensional 
co-occurrence spaces.  Associationist models, based heavily on research in connectionist 
representations, posit meaning primarly as a matrix of recorded word co-occurrences.  Landauer 
and Dumais' (1997) seminal Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) model of knowledge representation 
describes relationships among words through multidimensional analysis of word co-occurrences 
in a very large text corpus into a high dimensional space.  Although the dimensions are chosen 
mathematically, the authors contend that LSA's hyperspace could be isomorphic to a model of 
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semantic features, such as models described above; however, it is also possible that features only 
reflect an underlying system driven by estimates of semantic distance taken from word co-
occurrences.  For the present study, a discussion of the underlying nature of semantic 
representation will be postponed; instead, the LSA co-occurrence model will be used primarily to 
generate a surrogate measure of sociality for the preliminary study.  With this in mind, it is 
important to note that LSA uses the aggregate of the entire context of a word – in sentence or 
paragraph units – as a measure of its distance to other words; thus, words that rarely co-occur 
(synonyms, for example) will be semantic neighbors due to the similarity of their contexts.   
Embodied Cognition 
 “Embodied cognition” approaches, on the other hand, bypass abstract features of 
meaning or agnostic connectionist networks and link representation directly to perception and 
action.  Glenberg and Robertson’s (2000) primer in embodied cognition for psychology 
describes the Indexical Hypothesis, which describes language comprehension as multiple 
processes that link words to perceptual symbols, derive affordances (responses, actions) from 
perceptual symbols, and mesh the affordances with the sentence syntax to create an interpretation 
of a scenario that reflects what probably happened or what was conveyed.  Meaning is 
conceptualized as being stored in perceptual symbols similar to those described by Barsalou’s 
perceptual symbols theory (1999).  These are modal symbols that link words to the perceptual 
state initiated by the entity to which they refer.  Meaning retrieval is a type of re-experiencing.  
This framework maps nicely onto semantic effects such as concreteness, danger, and usefulness 
because each of these bears a relationship to both perceptual symbols and to responses and 
actions, but not as neatly onto sociality.  Still, I believe it is a useful framework for considering 
how behaviorally relevant aspects of meaning may structure the mental lexicon.  I discuss its 
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philosophical origins and the details of its framework in more detail below. 
 Embodied cognition represents a modern re-thinking of the nature of cognition.  It is a 
response to the Cartesian tradition of dualism that pervades the cognitive sciences – the notion 
that the mind is distinctly separated from the body.  While this is not often acknowledged, and 
while cognitive science does not frequently find itself in opposition with materialism, it is 
nonetheless a prevalent philosophy (Bennett, 2001).  In the traditional cognitivist approach, the 
nature of thinking is so different from any material (physiological) properties that one cannot be 
understood in terms of the other.  This can be seen in how representations are depicted in 
cognitive theories – amodal, abstract symbols.  Perceptions – both the physical stimuli and 
physiological perceptual processes – are viewed as unreliable, messy, and ultimately 
unsatisfactory for the complex thought processes which operate upon our knowledge.  While the 
nature / nurture debate has generally led psychologists to conclude that much of the world is 
learned through the senses, most theories of cognition posit a layer of abstraction between the 
deceptive senses and the mind.  Beyond that layer of abstraction, representations are governed by 
a rational mind that is frequently (although increasingly less frequently) likened to a digital 
computer.  The operands of the mind are not messy perceptions, but clean, abstract symbols.  
These function, in many ways, like the linguistic notion of words, which are signs that are 
arbitrarily related to what they signify.  Just as the word green bears no similarty to the physical 
property green, so does the mental of representation of green bear no resemblance to its 
perceptual form.  Implicit in this formulation of thought is the need for formal rules, which 
govern how perceptions are translated into abstract symbols (Anderson, 2003).  Cognition, then, 
is conceptualized as a series of rules that transform one cognitive state into another. 
 While cognitivism has had a prolific life in psychology, philosophy, cognitive science, 
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and linguistics, many researchers have begun to reject some of its basic tenets. Notably, 
embodied cognition rejects its most basic tenet: that the mind is distinct from the body. 
Embodied cognition has a philosophic tradition that can be traced back to the 17th century 
philosopher Benedictus de Spinoza. A contemporary of Rene Descartes, Spinoza rejected 
dualism in favor of parallelism: the cause of our behavior is ultimately physical, and can be 
understood physically, but it appears to be mental (Bennett, 2001). This is not simple 
associationism, which, to Spinoza, would resemble minimalism. Spinoza contrasts the events in a 
pinprick as understood through dualism and minimalism. Dualism posits three events: the mental 
event, pain, and a second mental event. Minimalism also posits three events: the jab, the material 
event, and the cry. However, minimalism is insufficient for understanding the event, according to 
Spinoza.  Pain has its own mental causes and effects, and intervenes between the jab and the cry. 
These material events must be paralleled by a mental event, and vice versa. All thoughts correspond 
to physical events, and all physical events correspond to thoughts. The simple components of thought 
are not recognizable as thought, and all human behavior can be understood in materialistic terms. 
According to this philosophical perspective, there is no need for a layer of abstraction between the 
physiological processes of sensation and the mental processes of cognition: the operands of cognitive 
functions correspond directly to the physical world. 
 Embodied cognition is most frequently encountered in the theoretical perspectives of Mark 
Johnson and George Lakoff (Johnson & Lakoff, 2002; Lakoff, 1987, 2001; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
1999). As cognitive linguists, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) virtually introduced embodied cognition to 
linguists, philosophers and psychologists as a process of conceptual metaphor. Embodied meaning 
was described as perceptual meaning: meaning that was unfiltered and indistinguishable from the 
physiological processes (sensory and motor) that acquired it. Higher-level concepts are understood 
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through embodied meaning by conceptual metaphor, which involves processes borrowed from 
linguistics and literature (e.g., metaphor, metonymy) and from cognitive psychology (e.g., radial 
categories, conceptual blending) which build embodied representations into more complex concepts 
(Johnson & Lakoff, 2002). Their early work (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) established the 
theoretical plausibility of embodiment by describing complex human concepts in embodied terms. 
For example, love is often described and may largely be understood as a journey; social 
organizations can be conceptualized as plants, knowing is seeing, personal preference is taste. These 
simpler concepts (e.g., journeys, plants, seeing, tasting) can then be readily described in terms of 
their sensorimotor experience, and thus the pathway between physiology and high-level concept is 
complete. Later (e.g., Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), the two authors expanded these few 
examples of high-level concepts into hundreds of examples of “primary conceptual metaphors” 
(Johnson & Lakoff, 2002, p. 245), such as more is up, which results from the coactivation of 
verticality and quantity concepts which are conflated through a child’s experience watching a glass 
of orange juice be poured. There are many examples where this concept is used linguistically (e.g., 
up the ante, raising money), and the authors conclude that young children, and later adults, find it 
convenient to conceptualize more as the perceptual experience of up. 
 Barsalou’s theory of perceptual symbol systems (1999) is an attempt to reconcile embodied 
cognition with existing empirical data on attention and categorization. In it, long term memory 
representations are shaped like perceptual states in sensory-motor systems. Selective attention, a well 
documented cognitive construct, extracts a subset of each perceptual state for long term storage. 
Unlike cognitivisist approaches to symbols, perceptual symbols are modal and analogical.  This 
approach has the added benefit of being physiologically efficient: instead of positing distinct neural 
areas and neural structures (which bring with them distinct patterns of neural growth), a single 
perceptual system underlies the bulk of cognition.  It is important to note that Barsalou does not 
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define perceptual symbols as a recording system, but as a conceptual system. A recording system 
creates an “attenuated copy” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 581) of what it records: for example, a photograph 
records some of the light present in a scene without making any interpretation. A true conceptual 
system, however, recognizes tokens within the visual scene and binds them to general types stored in 
memory. A conceptual system can also combine concepts (e.g., a snow ball can be represented by a 
ball concept and a snow concept).  
To this end, Barsalou introduces the concept of simulators into the perceptual symbols 
theory. Simulators function to allow modal symbolic manipulation. They allow an individual to 
activate previous representations during routine recognition to fit a token into a conceptual frame 
(e.g., fitting a steering wheel into the frame for car); to imagine counterfactuals; and to anticipate the 
effects of manipulations on stimuli. Simulation can follow the combination of multiple, multimodal 
experiences into a single concept, and involves the reactivation of stored perceptual patterns guided 
by attention.  Simulators are also key for perceptual search: the simulation of specific perceptual 
states associated with a target (e.g., bananas: yellow) guides the higher level interpretation of a visual 
scene. In this manner, individual differences in basic cognitive tasks can be explained, and 
demonstrated top-down effects can be modeled into perceptual symbols.  Critically, Barsalou extends 
this theory to underlie abstract concepts. He follows in Lakoff and Johnson’s footsteps by first 
proposing metaphor as a system of abstraction for perceptual symbols. Anger, for instance, can be a 
combination of the emotional state (affect being intimately related to the perceptual symbols theory) 
and the simulation of related perceptual states, such as liquid exploding from a container. In this 
manner, the association between the concept explode and the concept anger leads to a much more 
concrete understanding of the latter concept. Later, Barsalou proposes that many abstract concepts 
can be represented directly through perceptual symbols, and this appears to be a much more 
innovative alternative. In addition to static perceptual representations, perceptual symbols can 
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contain temporally extended knowledge. Event sequences can be represented perceptually via 
simulators. Symbols can also emphasize focal parts of experience: combined with the notion that 
symbols can be introspective states, a wide variety of abstract concepts can be simulated directly 
without metaphor. Marriage, then, can refer to a series of events (courtship, a ceremony, etc.) and a 
specific interpersonal relation (the focal part of the conjunction of the simulations of the parties). 
Similarly, more basic abstract concepts, such as truth, falsity, and negation can be represented via 
perceptual symbols and simulators. For example, truth can be represented as the experience of 
“successfully mapping an internal simulation into a perceived scene” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 601). This 
takes place after several evaluations of whether a simulation is accurate or not; the perceptual 
experience of a successful simulation itself becomes a symbol.   
Likewise, the perceptual experience of an unsuccessful simulation can also become a symbol 
– for falsity. Barsalou provides the following example: In trying to determine whether a balloon 
appears above a cloud, an individual simulates balloon, cloud, and above, and their combination. If 
that simulation maps onto the perceived scene, a perceptual state will arise: with enough pairings of 
any cognitively-driven simulation with a perceived scene and the resulting perceptual state, that 
perceptual state will come to be abstracted as truth, according to Barsalou. In that way, not only 
semantics, but the majority of cognitive processes (i.e., those that involve logic) are driven by 
perceptual symbols. Barsalou thus is presenting a comprehensive theory of cognition based on modal 
symbols stored in perceptual systems.  It is the long-term goal of this study to lay the basic 
framework for a comprehensive theory of cognition based upon symbols grounded in social thought. 
Empirical Evidence for Embodied Cognition 
 Wilson (2002) identified several observations about cognition that make an embodied 
framework attractive. First, cognition appears to be situated: while a task is being carried out, 
perception continues, and task-relevant information comes in that can affect processing. Wilson 
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provides the examples of driving and conversing as activities that are clearly situated: task-relevant 
information is constantly pouring in through the sensory systems. Although Wilson describes tasks 
that are likely not situated (e.g., planning, remembering), and is critical of attempts to frame human 
evolutionary context in situated task contexts only (gathering, potentially less situated than hunting, 
was probably also more prevalent), conversations remain a likely situated task. This suggests, then, 
that language use tasks are time-pressured, and the mind, mid-conversation, may not have time to 
“build up a full-blown mental model of the environment, from which to derive a plan of action” 
(Wilson, 2002, p. 628). In this context, an embodied approach to representation would be preferable, 
if internal representations are employed at all. Again, while Wilson succeeds in providing many 
examples of non-time-pressured cognition, many examples of language use are not among them. 
Finally, Wilson notes that many uses of cognition are designed for action: improved perceptual skills, 
she notes, evolutionarily provided improved motor control. If that is the case, then representations 
that best permit improved motor control will be the most adaptive, and these are likely to be 
representations that are embodied. While Wilson rejects many of the most radical tenets of embodied 
cognition, she makes a case for the embodiment of working memory representations (Wilson, 2001). 
Certain conceptualizations (e.g., the articulatory loop) and observations (e.g., the effect of 
articulatory suppression) point to a working memory system that employs sensorimotor encoding. 
 Recently, there has been a surge in research looking specifically at the embodied cognition 
hypothesis. Pecher, Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2003; 2004) investigated the existence of perceptual 
symbols in routine perceptual processing in a series of experiments. In a property verification task 
(Pecher et al., 2003), participants were presented a concept (e.g., BLENDER) and a property (e.g., 
loud) and asked to respond, as quickly as possible, if the property were usually true of the concept. 
Critically, trial order was manipulated so that sometimes two adjacent trials would present properties 
of the same modality (e.g., loud and rustling), while sometimes the modalities would differ (e.g., 
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loud and sour). Based on Barsalou’s (1999) perceptual symbols theory, the authors hypothesized that 
trials in which the modality had not changed from the previous trial would have faster reaction times 
than trials in which the modality had changed from the previous trial. This is due to the cost of 
switching from one perceptual system to another during the simulation of different modality 
concepts. The hypothesis was supported: the cost of switching modalities was observed to be 29 
milliseconds. In order to control for the possible effects of greater semantic association between 
same-modality properties, a second experiment was conducted comparing semantically-associated 
property pairs to unassociated pairs; no effect was observed here. In a second study (Pecher et al., 
2004), a similar effect was observed at longer latencies. In each block, the same concept (e.g., apple) 
was presented twice, but with two different properties. Sometimes the properties were same-modality 
(e.g., green, shiny), and sometimes they were different-modality (green, tart). When both 
presentations included same-modality properties, there was an RT advantage of 34-41 msec if the 
number of intervening trials was 12 or 18. When the number of intervening trials (the number of 
trials between the first presentation of apple and the second) was fewer, there was no RT advantage 
to using same-modality properties. The authors concluded that representations are componential and 
not holistic: relevant aspects of concepts are activated when needed, and these aspects tend to be 
grouped by modality. Recent experience with a modality tends to keep that modality activated. 
Because of the modality-specificity of these results, the authors conclude that sensorimotor systems 
play an important role in cognition.  
 In a similar study, Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) presented sentences to subjects that 
described objects in specific locations. Then, they were asked to indicate whether a picture presented 
represented something that had been mentioned in the sentence. The critical manipulation here was 
that the picture sometimes portrayed the animal or object as it would sit in the sentence, and 
sometimes it did not. For example, if the animal in the sentence was eagle, and its location was nest 
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(e.g, The ranger saw the eagle in its nest), then a matching picture would be of an eagle sitting, while 
a mismatching picture might portray an eagle flying. The authors observed that reaction times were 
longer for trials in which mismatching pictures were presented than matching pictures (Experiment 
1), and that matching picture conditions were equivalent to a neutral condition, in which the sentence 
did not specific any configuration of the target object or animal (Experiment 2). The authors 
concluded that specific images were activated automatically during sentence comprehension, and that 
this is consistent with a representation of meaning that is based on perceptions. This study is 
particularly relevant, because it involves the perception of sentences, as opposed to single words, and 
requires a somewhat complex semantic interpretation on the part of the participant in order to get the 
observed reaction time disadvantage in the mismatch condition. In addition, the effect seems to occur 
during sentence parsing, not during the picture probe (at which point there would be no benefit to 
parsing the sentence and engaging in mental imagery for anything beyond its constituent nouns). 
That suggests that perceptual simulation is routine. 
 Additional evidence supporting the embodied cognition hypothesis comes from cognitive 
neuroscience. Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, Minor, and Thompson-Schill (2003) used fMRI to measure 
cortical activity during a property verification task. Behaviorally, the authors replicated Solomon 
(1997). Concepts selected from 18 superordinate categories (e.g., car, cow) were paired with physical 
part properties (e.g., hood, udder). Additionally, two types of false pairs were constructed: associated 
sets (e.g., canary-sing) and unassociated sets (canary-wine). The association strength was varied in 
each group, but the average strength between the true and false associated sets was equivalent. 
Critically, participants were assigned to associated false or unassociated false conditions. In the 
associated false condition, associated false pairs were presented which required a no response; these 
trials differed from true trials in that the property was not a physical part of the target concept. 
Participants in the associated condition were significantly less accurate and slower at verifying 
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properties than participants in the unassociated condition. The concurrent fMRI was aimed at looking 
at a region of interest in the left fusiform gyrus, which has been associated with mental imagery. The 
authors hypothesized that when conceptual information was required (when the associated false trials 
were presented), the left fusiform gyrus should show activation if that conceptual information is 
grounded in the perceptual system. Because conceptual information was not required when the 
unassociated false trials were presented (because responses could be based on associative strength 
alone), the authors did not expect to see any conceptual activation. The fMRI analysis supported their 
hypotheses: a region of the visual association cortex was activated during the retrieval of semantic 
information without explicit instructions to engage in mental imagery. This provides physiological 
evidence that there is a relationship between imagery and semantics.  
 Although a good developmental theory of embodied cognition will be essential for 
establishing its legitimacy, this appears to be lacking in the literature. Thelen (1996; 2000), however, 
began the work of formulating a theory of motor development that emphasizes the unit of perception, 
action and cognition. Thelen (1996) describes infant motor development in a dynamic systems 
framework, but adopts an embodied approach in order to coordination modeling problems. For 
example, the multiple degrees of freedom available to an infant who is learning to crawl or reach 
pose a massive problem first; over time, this is somehow overcome and the infant achieves a stable 
motor pattern via experience. How experience helps to overcome that problem is a question that is 
difficult for dualists to answer; however, in an embodied approach, Thelen argues, cognition emerges 
as a product of learning the relation between perception and action.  By viewing cognition as 
emergent, Thelen seems to be arguing that it is the environment and the mental states of infants that 
eventually give rise to higher level faculties. Later I will argue that interactions between a child and 
their social environment may lead to emergent thought; that this coincides with language 
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development and developing cognitive capabilities may suggest a deep relationship between the 
three. 
 In conclusion, embodied cognition, as a framework, has several manifestations, but overall 
empirical evidence is growing that perceptions are routinely activated and may underlie thought in a 
variety of cognitive tasks. Furthermore, cognition may be uniquely tuned for interaction with the 
physical environment, and the success of embodied theories in specifying a relationship between the 
mind and the environment makes it an attractive framework for developing a theory of mind and 
social environment interactivity. In the following sections, I will link evidence from the social 
psychology and language acquisition literature with the embodied frameworks I’ve discussed to 
introduce a theory of social semantics. 
A New Framework: Social Psychology, the Development of Language, and Semantics 
Social Psychology and the Development of Language 
 Several recent theoretical developments and studies in social psychology bear on the 
possibility of socially-grounded semantic systems. First, the recent bourgeoning of social cognition 
stresses how tied social psychology and cognitive psychology really are. Social cognition is an 
approach to the study of social psychology and personality, which emphasizes how people process 
social information, especially its encoding, storage, retrieval, and application to social situations. 
Social cognition tends to focus on the information processing framework within cognitive 
psychology, but, as will be argued later, its reliance upon cognitivist notions of representation (i.e., 
amodal symbols) does not render the empirical work or overarching theories irrelevant within an 
embodied framework. Second, research in language development has demonstrated clear links 
between language and social behavior. Using evidence from social cognition studies and social 
development, the goal of this section is to show that social language acquisition parallels social 
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development; that social representations are easily activated and nearly ubiquitous; and that the 
representations of others are closely linked to self-representations.  
Baldwin and Moses (2001) presented child speech errors to support a hypothesis that 
language acquisition is informed by social understanding. In order to learn to map words onto 
objects, the authors argue, children need to disregard many potential links between words and things 
in the world; more often than not, words are spoken in the absence of their referent, but with other 
potentially misleading referents present. The crucial factor is interpreting the speaker’s intention to 
talk about the objects at hand, and this likely requires the processing of social cues. Previous research 
by Baldwin (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1996) has demonstrated that infants 19-20 months old can resist 
potential but invalid links between objects and words. For example, when infants are presented a new 
object, and an accompanying speaker, gazing toward the object, pronounces a novel name (e.g., ‘A 
dawnoo!’), children demonstrated that they successfully linked the new word to the new object 
during instructed reaching. However, when the speaker was seated out of the infants’ view, infants 
appeared to resist making the link. In both cases, the acoustic cues and temporally contiguity were 
identical; the only difference was the appearance of the speaker. Additional studies have shown 
infants are sensitive to a variety of social clues when learning words, including gaze direction, body 
posture, voice direction, and hand position during both noun learning and verb learning. As children 
become more sensitive to social clues, word learning gains speed (e.g., in pre-school). The authors 
argue that this isn’t due to fundamental cognitive processes (e.g., memory and attention), but is due 
to genuine social understanding. Overall, the authors note a wide variety of observations that support 
the notion that language learning demonstrates acute sensitivity to social cues, even in young 
children. This is a necessary pre-requisite to a theory that posits that semantics have a social basis: if 
language acquisition precedes primary social development, then one can hardly argue that language 
emerged from social cognition.  
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 Outside of the realm of word learning, there is evidence for a requirement of social 
understanding in successful language interactions in children with peers. Smiley (2001) assessed 
intention understanding in peer-interactions with 19-39 month-old children during play with long-
term acquaintances. The author hypothesized that understanding prior intention – representing 
others’ intentions as goals that indicate future action – is an important part of coordinated interactions 
between two goal-driven individuals. Intention-understanding was assessed through interviews, in 
which events were shown to children, followed by questions related to the intentional behavior of the 
participants in the taped events. For example, during a video segment in which a child asked for, and 
then took, a toy, the child might be prompted What did Adam do? and then Why did she take it? The 
latter question directly queries for intentionality. To measure peer-interaction, children were 
videotaped at home with friends with minimal parent intervention. A variety of behaviors were 
recorded, including nonverbal gestures and speech acts. The author observed that intention 
understanding did predict differences in children’s interactions. Children with higher levels of 
intention understanding (the prior intention group, who understood that intentions precede actions) 
were more likely to use distal means of interaction (speech) than intrusive, proximal means (taking 
objects) when interacting with peers. In other words, children with greater social understanding were 
more likely to use language than children with poorer social understanding to accomplish a goal. 
This study stresses the importance of social understanding for successful peer interaction and 
language use, but, again, it also fails to adequately control for general cognitive ability, 
 Beyond the understanding of peer and parent intentionality, there is evidence that 
understanding intentionality (theory of mind, in most cognitive developmental frameworks) plays a 
role in understanding group behavior (i.e., collective intentionality). Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003) 
describe what they believe to be a second stage in social and cognitive development: the 4 – 5 year 
transition where children begin to participate in cultural activities. It is at this point, the authors note, 
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that humans really become distinct as a species. Pathological evidence (e.g., from children with 
autism) suggests that at this age joint attentional skills begin to show variability and can predict later 
social performance and intentionality understanding. At 5 years of age, cultural institutions become 
realities, and intentionality is viewed as potentially collective. It is important to note that a growth in 
intentionality understanding is associated with an understanding of higher level cultural concepts, 
because it is in direct opposition to the embodied theory of abstract concepts, which states that these 
are learned through metaphorical extension of simpler perceptual concepts, without requiring, as 
Tomasello and Rakoczy posit, an innate biological mechanism geared toward better comprehending 
the social world. While the embodied approach stresses a certain efficiency which is appealing, the 
latter approach that is currently being discussed is better grounded both in studies of ethology (e.g., 
Seyfarth, Cheney, & Bergman, 2005) and child language acquisition and cognitive development. 
This indicates to me that for embodied cognition to more successfully model abstract concepts, it will 
have to take into account alternatives to purely sensorimotor-based explanations.  
 While the above examples show a clear relationship between social understanding and 
language learning and use, they rely upon an ultimately cognitive notion to operationalize social 
development: comprehension. One counter-argument to any deeper claims about social development 
and language is that social understanding is a part of intelligence, and as such is a cognitive ability. 
To circumvent this problem, other conceptualizations of social development need to be explored. In 
one such example, Locke (2001) investigated the classic social concept of attachment and its 
relationship to language. The author argued that language acquisition cannot be understood through a 
conventional information-oriented approach. Instead, infants learn words because they appear in a 
social space: one which they’ve already entered, at birth, through vocalization. Instead of 
emphasizing the information transferring properties of speech, Locke emphasizes phatic 
communication - the relational function of speech. Language serves to bond individuals together, and 
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this function is not limited to communication between an infant and its caregiver. Indeed, the author 
notes that much speech cannot be characterized as informational: much of it is self-regulatory, or 
tension-discharging, and much of the speech that does transmit information transmits shared 
information: information the receiving party undoubtedly knows. To this end, Locke emphasizes, 
phylogenetically, the social root of language, and goes on to discuss how vocal behaviors in infants 
(humans and animals) aid in both attachment formation and language development. The amount of 
visual attention shared between mothers and infants, for example, predicts both attachment and 
vocabulary development (Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). The author indicates that this suggests infants 
want to understand their mother and, the more time they spend looking at what she is looking at, the 
better they will be able to do so, and vocabulary acquisition is a side-effect. An alternative, however, 
is that the more a child wants to understand its parent, the faster it will learn language. This is 
supported by observations by blind children, who learn language at the same rate as sighted children 
without the benefit of shared visual attention. Ultimately, Locke is suggesting that a social 
motivation, and not a cognitive motivation, underlies language acquisition, and that only later does 
language become a tool of asocial thought. Importantly, this is a step towards demonstrating that 
language’s roots are ultimately social, which is an important piece of any theory of grounding.  
 Given how much of language acquisition appears to be socially motivated and moderated, it 
is not surprising that language, as a conceptual topic, comes up frequently in social interactions. Ely, 
Gleason, MacGibbon, and Zaretsky (2001) observed dinner table conversations among families with 
young children (2 to 5.5 years of age), and found that a large percentage of utterances (around 7% on 
average) contained language-focused terms, such as say, ask, tell, and speak. While the percentage of 
use of these terms was not related to child age (4% across children observed), it was more prevalent 
in adults (11% in mothers, 7% in fathers). Much of this use was elicitation (Can you tell Daddy who 
had supper with us last night?), and much of it was pedagogical: parents asked their children to label 
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objects, and corrected them if they make a mistake. This surprising result suggests that in the home 
social environment there is an emphasis on both communication and language itself as a cognitive 
skill. Because the authors do not report any other cognitive domains of related terms that frequently 
occur in regular discourse, it’s unknown how dominant language is as a conceptual topic in family 
discourse, but nonetheless it appears to be a singular cognitive skill that preoccupies both parents and 
children. Also, this supports Locke’s (2001) notion that much of speech is not about transmitting 
information. Sometimes people speak to prompt speech – and sometimes that prompted speech 
serves a non-informational function.  
 Additional theories of parallel and interacting social and cognitive development can be found 
in Tomasello’s usage-based theory of language acquisition (e.g., Tomasello, 2000) and, more 
generally, in social cognition literature (e.g., Garfield, Peterson, & Perry, 2001; Maass, Karasawa, 
Politi, & Suga, 2006; Meier & Robinson, 2005; Prentice & Miller, 2006). However, of specific 
relevance to a theory of embodied cognition, are a diverse set of neurological findings pointing to a 
possible unity of the mind, the body, and the other. Recently, mirror neurons have received a lot of 
press: these are cortical neurons that respond both to one’s own actions and to the actions of a 
perceived other. Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, and Perrett (2001) proposed that these may play a 
large role in autism: children with deficient mirror neurons may be unable to properly imitate others. 
The authors explain how imitation may be an important part of developing a theory of mind.  If the 
imitation of others is grounded in the mind in such a concrete, specialized way as neurons, this 
suggests that the perception of others – and perhaps intentionality – is in fact a very special type of 
perception. The uniqueness of person perception has been supported to an extent, perceptually, by 
conditions such as prosopagnosia (face blindness) and feature detectors that correspond to body 
parts. It has also been supported in the social cognition literature on representation. Sebanz, 
Knoblich, and Prinz (2003) found that participants were sensitive to the actions – and the available 
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actions – of a cohort during a joint go-no go task. The repertoire of actions available to the second 
agent seemed to facilitate participant responding, suggesting they were represented alongside and in 
a similar form to the participants’ own.  
 To conclude this section, there is a wealth of evidence supporting the notion that social 
understanding and perception play a large role in a variety of cognitive tasks, and that social 
behavior, as we know it, ontogenetically and phylogenetically predates much of what we consider 
cognition. In the next section I will attempt to briefly describe what an embodied theory of cognition 
might look like that recognizes language’s social roots. 
A New Framework 
 There are two ways that the social development literature can be reconciled with embodied 
cognition. First, social development can be likened to perceptual development, but a specific type, 
with its own associated neural areas. Second, mechanisms of embodied cognition can be incorporated 
into theories of socio-cognitive development. In the first way, the logic of embodied cognition is, by 
and large, preserved. Simple concepts are perceptual. Instead of a person or a relationship concept 
being componential, it may be, neurally, discrete and noncomponential. It would then be subject to 
well documented cognitive processes, like selective attention, via simulators. The ultimately rich 
representations of significant individuals in our lives would be multimodal, with emotional and 
introspective perceptual properties having a great deal of prominence.  
On the other hand, social cognition and the social and language development literature could 
benefit from the incorporation of metaphorical extension. If language is for action, and much action 
is social, it makes sense to represent language concepts in social terms. Higher level concepts, then, 
would be grounded not in the most basic of perceptions, but in the uniquely human perceptions that 
accompany our social functioning. This would place a layer of phylogenetic abstraction between 
basic motor and perceptual systems and higher level cognition: a layer representing people, minds, 
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and relationships. Democracy, for example, would be understood in noncomponential, social 
symbols, as opposed to noncomponential perceptual symbols. However, the basic structure of both 
sets of symbols would be isomorphic: they would be housed in the same perceptual systems that 
generated the initial experience and be subject to perceptual processes and selective attention. 
Importantly, social symbols would more readily map concepts onto social actions, of which language 
is one.  
 In order to investigate the social grounding of meaning, the currently popular task for 
investigating perceptual symbols – the property verification task – may be the most easily adapted. 
Social cognition research has shed light on the conceptual structure of the person and relational 
representation; applied to property verification, person concepts may manifest themselves as 
concepts while relationships act as properties. Thus, words associated with one set of relationships 
(e.g., kinship) may facilitate one another while another set of relationships (e.g., professional) do not. 
Similarly, emotional properties of individuals, relationships, and communities could easily be 
incorporated.  
 A second tactic to investigate social grounding may be a corpus linguistics approach. Just as 
early embodied cognition adopters identified embodied and perceptual metaphor in literature and 
discourse, similar trends might be found for relational thought. One example: bigger and precursor is 
maternal; smaller and successor is child. Surely more can be found, and these might more readily be 
explained through relational grounding than sensorimotor embodiment.  
 A third approach is more general. It remains to be shown that the simplest components of 
cognition (e.g., semantics) are tuned for behavior. A limited set of promising work (e.g., Wurm,  
2007; Wurm & Vakoch, 2000; Wurm, et al. 2003; Wurm & Seaman, 2008) suggests that language 
recognition, at one of its more basic levels – spoken word perception – is sensitive to behaviorally 
relevant properties (e.g., danger and usefulness). This represents an important step towards 
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demonstrating that cognition is situated and reflects the context it evolved in; however, much more 
work needs to be done to fully demonstrate the pervasiveness of this trend.  Applied to social 
psychology, this fits with the language acquisition framework of Lev Vygotsky (e.g., 1997), in that 
language’s roots are social and, in turn, it is found to be used primarily within a social behavioral 
context.  It is this avenue that I have explored in the current study. 
The current study 
 The current study is a visual and auditory word recognition investigation into potential 
social effects.   
 The lexical decision task is a commonly used task to investigate factors that affect word 
recognition speed.  It has been shown to be modestly affected by semantic variables.  The current 
study uses both visual and auditory lexical decision tasks as well as visual word naming to 
investigate on-line word processing. 
 Potential social biases will be operationalized two ways: 
1. Participant ratings on a social/non-social scale (Experiment 1). 
2. High-dimensional meaning representation computations (Preliminary Study). 
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CHAPTER 2 PRELIMINARY STUDY  
Objective LSA scores and an extant data set 
 To investigate the possibility of a social semantic bias in word recognition, a preliminary 
study was conducted using data from the English Lexicon Project (ELP; Balota, Yap, Cortese, 
Hutchison, Kessler, Loftis, Neely, Nelson, Simpson, & Treiman, 2007).  This data consists of 
visually presented lexical decision and naming reaction times and accuracy data for thousands of 
words and hundreds of participants.   
Materials 
 The stimuli consisted of the 2,689 most frequent words in the ELP data set that were also 
available in the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) corpus.  For each word, the following values 
were obtained: 
 Frequency (all items, from the British National Corpus [Leech, Rayson, & Wilson, 
 2001]); 
 Number of phonemes (all items, measured by ELP); 
 N (Phonological neighborhood size of all items, measured by ELP); 
 Concreteness (1167 items, from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database [Coltheart, 1981]); 
 Age of Acquisition (AoA; 531 items, from MRC); 
 Written / Spoken Frequency Ratio (all items, see below); 
 Semantic sociality (all items, see below). 
 Semantic sociality was estimated using the LSA corpus (Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  
Values were obtained as follows: First, a one-to-many LSA distance computation was made 
between each of the 2,689 items and a set of subject-case pronouns that anaphorically refer, 
generally, to human subjects: he, she, we, I, and they.  This involves finding the semantic 
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distance between each item in the ELP set and each of the pronouns in my small LSA set, and 
then taking an average for each item.  The basic framework of semantic distance computation is 
outlined above.  A second set of scores was done using a one-to-one distance computation, using 
each word in the ELP set and the non-person pronoun it.  Therefore for each item two distance 
scores were computed: one for person pronouns (person-distance), and one for the non-person 
pronoun it (non-person-distance; note that this does not differentiate between the regular pronoun 
use of it and non-literal uses of it, as in “it remains to be seen,” which further adds to the 
imprecision of this measure).  Person-distance was conceptualized as measuring how 
semantically related a target word is to people, as used in everyday language.  Non-person 
distance was conceptualized as measuring how semantically related a target word is to things, 
again as used in everyday language.  Critically, the analyses described below use the ratio of 
person-distance to non-person-distance as a surrogate for the semantic sociality of the word.  
Using a ratio was essential to control for the relationship between the log of word frequency and 
both person-distance (r = .43) and non-person-distance (r = .57) (resulting in a bivariate 
correlation of r = .11).  The resulting value can be thought of as how much more likely a word is 
to be used in the context of people than it is in the context of things.  It was predicted that the 
more likely a word is to be used in the context of people, the faster it would be responded to in 
word recognition paradigms. 
Results 
 Bivariate correlations between relevant measures can be seen in Table 1.  Sociality has a 
higher bivariate correlation with naming times and an equivalent correlation with lexical decision 
times to the mainstay of semantic effects in word naming – concreteness.  It is also comparable 
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to the strength of the log of word frequency, one of the most studied and oft-observed lexical 
effects in word recognition. 
 However, to better estimate the effect of sociality on naming and lexical decision times, 
simultaneous regressions were computed using different combinations of the variables described 
above as continuous independent variables, and lexical decision and naming reaction times from 
the ELP as dependent variables.  The results of these analyses can be seen in Tables 2-4.  In the 
first analysis (Table 2), all of the items were included, and only variables for which a value was 
obtained for each item were used.  In both lexical decision and naming RT analyses, sociality 
was significantly facilitative, even with significant length and frequency effects included in the 
model (and a significant neighborhood effect in lexical decision).  In the second analysis (Table 
3), less than half of the RTs were used to accommodate concreteness scores into the models.  
While concreteness was facilitative in both the lexical decision and naming models, sociality was 
only significant in the naming model (facilitating RTs).  In the third analysis (Table 4), a much 
smaller set of RTs was analyzed to accommodate age of acquisition values.  Surprisingly, AoA 
was quite strong in both analyses and neither concreteness nor sociality were significant in either 
model, and frequency was only significant in naming.  To check the effect of AoA on the naming 
dataset at large, a fourth analysis was conducted using all of the words and only length, N, 
frequency, sociality, and an age of acquisition surrogate computed by taking the ratio of a word's 
written frequency to its spoken frequency.  In the naming version of this model, sociality was 
marginally facilitative (p < .06).      
Discussion 
 As expected, increased semantic sociality significantly facilitates reaction time in both 
naming and reaction time tasks.  However, the strength of this facilitation varied in this data set 
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depending upon covariates and data set size – as the data set shrunk to about 500 items, and age 
of acquisition and concreteness were included, the relationship was no longer significant.  That 
said, it is worth noting that even concreteness was not significant in that analysis.  This suggests 
that this data set may possess the peculiar property of being overly sensitive to age of acquisition 
– to the extent that the bivariate relationship between response latency and age of acquisition 
absorbs predictable variability and prevents other variables from achieving expected 
significance.  In support, the fourth analysis suggests that, when looking at the entire data set and 
using an AoA surrogate, there remains an effect of sociality in naming, even if marginally. 
 Nonetheless, it is important to note that this objective measure is a surrogate for what will 
ultimately be a subjectively rated sociality measure.  While AoA and concreteness scores in 
these models were obtained using well-conducted rating studies, sociality was assessed through a 
novel method of computing semantic distance scores from the LSA corpus.  Still, a relationship 
between sociality, recognition latency, and age of acquisition seems evident.  It was the goal of 
the following experiments to assess this relationship using subjective ratings, a more powerful 
within-subject analysis of lexical decision latencies, and visual and auditory lexical decision 
tasks. 
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CHAPTER 3 EXPERIMENT 1 
Subjective ratings 
 A more traditional approach to collecting semantic information is through subjective 
ratings.  In this experiment, subjects rated a set of words on a bipolar social – non-social 
dimension in an on-line study.  
Method 
Participants 
 75 Wayne State University undergraduate students in psychology were recruited to 
participate in this study.  Participants were given extra credit in psychology courses for their 
voluntary participation.   
 Of these 75 participants, 13 did not complete the task as asked, either by failing to 
complete every trial (11 subjects) or by not making correct use of the rating instrument 
(described below), providing answers with little to no variance (2 subjects).  Of the 62 remaining 
subjects, 223 ratings (1.5% of total trials ) were removed due to having excessively long reaction 
times (greater than ten seconds), indicating the participants may have paused their participation 
in the task, which was not monitored, mid-trial. 
Materials 
 The stimuli were 200 nouns selected to have extant values on the following dimensions: 
1. Lexical decision and naming performance from the ELP  (see above). 
2. Age of acquisition scores (see above). 
3. Concreteness values (see above). 
Of the more than 500 nouns that met these criteria, 220 (200 target words and 20 practice 
words) were randomly selected.   
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Ratings were made using a computerized slider.  Subjects were presented a slider bar in 
their Internet browser window that they were instructed to manipulate using a mouse.  Moving 
the slider left moved it toward a label that said PEOPLE and moving the slider right moved it 
toward a label that read ANYTHING ELSE.  A submit rating button was used to confirm their 
assigned rating. 
Procedure 
 Testing was done remotely via a testing application embedded on a website hosted on a 
computer run by the experimenter.  The application was a Java applet (Sun Microsystems), 
retrieved by participants’ browsers and run locally on their computers.  Java was selected for its 
robustness, technological maturity, and multiplatform compatibility.  It also has commonly 
installed libraries for playing sound, albeit with a few caveats (see below).  Keller, 
Gunasekharan, Mayo and Corley (2009) demonstrated that Java timing over the web over 
multiple platforms is sufficiently comparable to lab testing.  Java applets have very flexible 
graphical interface options, allowing for unique graphical configurations.  For example, in the 
current study, a slider bar was implemented to obtain ratings, as opposed to an 8 point scale.  
This allowed for an intuitive and simple task that was simultaneously sensitive, and also, by 
virtue of requiring the slider to be moved from its default position, permitted easy recognition of 
shirking participants. 
 Participants were instructed to rate visually presented words by how likely they were to 
use the word in a conversation about people or a conversation about anything else.  They were 
instructed to move the slider left if they were more likely to use a word in a conversation about 
people, and to move the slider right if they were more likely to use a word in a conversation 
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about anything else.  During each rating, labels were presented to remind subjects of the poles of 
the rating axis.   
Participants completed 20 practice trials before rating 200 words.   Ratings were recorded 
on a 0 – 100 point scale.  50 indicated no preference (or no movement from the default slider 
position); 0 indicated the participant was extremely likely to use the word in a conversation 
about people; 100 indicated the participant was extremely likely to use the word in a 
conversation about anything else.  Reaction times were also recorded, from the display of the 
target word to the submission of the rating (via clicking a “Submit rating” button with their 
mouse).   
Data Analysis 
After data cleaning (see above), responses were averaged over each word, and scores 
were reversed (by subtracting each word’s mean rating from the maximum rating) so that higher 
values indicated more likelihood of use in a conversation about people.  Ratings were then 
correlated with lexical values on several other dimensions, and linear models were computed to 
see the overall relationship between these ratings and the known set of relevant variables. 
The new variables introduced at this stage were: 
1. Frequency values from CELEX (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 1993).  
These were used to better correspond to previous studies into semantics and 
word recognition. 
2. Polysemy, as operationalized by number of synonym sets associated with each 
word (Miller, 1990).  The number of distinct uses of a word, sometimes known 
as polysemy or semantic complexity, is known to affect word recognition in 
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complex ways, and controlling for complexity was essential to test the viability 
of the sociality construct. 
3. Animacy – although English has few grammatical markings for semantic 
animacy, there is evidence that animate nouns are conferred processing benefits 
(e.g., Wurm, Whitman, Seaman, Hill & Ulstad, 2007).  Animacy was rated as a 
three level factor: 0 for words with inanimate referents (e.g., article); 2 for 
words with animate referents (e.g., beast), and 1 for words with generally 
animate referents (e.g., committee).   
4. Bigram frequency, the frequency of encountering two-letter combinations in 
the English language.  While the data on whether there is any influence of 
bigram frequency on lexical decision and naming tasks are mixed (e.g., 
Andrews, 1992), it’s a well-known lexical variable and is included for 
completeness. 
5. Additional length measures – number of morphemes, number of syllables, 
number of phonemes – to make as strong a correction as possible for form-
based influences on response timing and accuracy.  Although these are largely 
redundant, they are not fully redundant.  As such, any model which includes 
several length measures, while complicating the assessment of any individual 
length predictor, should leave unrelated variables more-or-less unaffected.  
This was done to make as conservative an estimate of the effect of sociality on 
word recognition as possible. 
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Results 
 Significant bivariate correlations between ratings (“Rated Sociality”), reaction times, and 
other lexical measures are shown in table 5.  As expected, rated sociality correlates significantly 
and positively with the LSA ratio obtained in the preliminary studies (r = 0.25), and, as expected, 
this correlation was well below 1, indicating that the computationally derived surrogate, while 
the best lexical predictor of rated sociality, was still an imperfect surrogate.  Interestingly, the 
variable that correlates highest with rated sociality is lexical decision accuracy obtained in the 
ELP, used in the preliminary studies analysis, suggesting that ELP lexical decision performance 
can be predicted by rated sociality.  Other variables included here will be used in later regression 
studies to control, primarily, for form-based variability in the target words under study.  Further 
analyses related to ELP tasks are described below. 
 To assess the composite contributions of lexical variables to rated sociality – in other 
words, the percentage of rated sociality which can be explained by known lexical variables – a 
linear model was computed predicting sociality using the other lexical variables shown in Table 
5, as well as a factor, semantic animacy.  As expected, the model significantly predicted rated 
sociality, with an adjusted R-Squared of .286 (p < .001).  By contrast, a similar model was run on 
other rated lexical variables, and, for a conservative estimate, rated sociality was excluded.  
Concreteness was predicted with an adjusted R-Squared of .48; age of acquisition was predicted 
with an adjusted R-Squared of .682, both significant at p < .001.  This suggests that, while rated 
sociality is significantly related to semantic and form-based lexical variables, this relationship is 
far weaker than it is in two commonly used rated variables, and that rated sociality has far more 
unexplained variance.  Therefore, it is expected that any effect that rated sociality has on 
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behavior is more likely to be due to unique aspects of rated sociality rather than the variance it 
happens to share with other variables. 
 Finally, to get a preliminary idea of the effect of sociality on word recognition, 
simultaneous regressions were computed using the all of the above referenced lexical variables, 
including rated sociality, and ELP task data.  Results for only significant variables in the lexical 
decision task are shown in Table 6.  Words with fewer letters and with smaller orthographic 
neighborhoods were responded to significantly faster than words higher on those dimensions.  
Aside from this, only three lexical variables showed marginal (p < .10) significance): more 
synonym sets, earlier acquisition, and higher rated sociality were associated with marginally 
faster response times.  Only sociality predicted response accuracy: Better accuracy was 
associated with a higher likelihood of being used in a conversation about people (p < .001).  
Notably, across both dependent variables, the only semantic variable consistently predicting 
lexical decision performance in the ELP data set for these nouns was rated sociality (albeit 
marginally in reaction time). 
 The pattern was different for ELP naming data (see Table 7).  While again words with 
fewer letters were associated with significantly faster RTs (p < .001), the only other significant 
variable was age of acquisition (showing the same effect as was seen marginally above, p < .05).  
The number of synonym sets associated with a word was marginally predictive of reaction time 
(showing the reverse trend as above, p < .10), and there was a nonsignificant facilitative trend (p 
= .128) of rated sociality.  All other effects were less likely than sociality, and no variables 
predicted naming accuracy.  This suggests that while rated sociality may predict word 
recognition performance, it does so far better for lexical decisions than naming, although the 
ELP naming data overall showed very little influence of lexical variables.  However, across both 
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tasks, rated sociality showed far more relevance than frequency, concreteness, orthographic 
neighborhood, and bigram frequency. 
Discussion 
 Two major findings emerged from the rating study – first, that ELP lexical decision 
performance was predicted by rated sociality, independent of a host of form-based and otherwise 
lexical measures; second, that rated sociality, while related to other lexical variables, is related 
far less so than the two predominant rated variables – concreteness and age of acquisition – 
indicating that the effect of rated sociality in a simultaneous regression should be more 
distinguishable from other variables.  However, due to the scarcity of significant effects, and the 
lack of within-subject variance, a visual lexical decision task was computed to obtain subject-
level data for a better analysis of the effect of rated sociality. 
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CHAPTER 4 EXPERIMENT 2 
Visual Lexical Decision 
 Social semantic effects in visual word recognition were investigated in a task that is 
largely considered sensitive to word recognition processes – lexical decision.  Lexical decision 
reaction times are generally considered to be dependent upon lexical access times; variables that 
influence lexical decision times are therefore likely to be related to lexical access times.  The 
goal of this experiment was to assess the influence of sociality on lexical access times using trial-
level data obtained in a new experiment.  It was hypothesized that lexical access times would be 
shorter as scores on rated sociality rise.  Error analyses were also conducted, with accuracy of 
lexical decision performance expected to be higher for words with higher sociality; however, due 
to the normally low error rate of lexical decision tasks, this trend may not reach significance. 
Participants 
 Seventy-one undergraduate students from the Wayne State University psychology subject 
pool were recruited to participate.  All subjects were native speakers of English.  Participants 
received extra credit in a psychology course for their participation. 
 Of these 71 subjects, 5 were removed for not completing the task.  Of the remaining 
trials, 239 (~ 1.5%) were removed for having excessively long or short RTs (beyond two 
standard deviations from the mean).  No subjects were removed due to excessive inaccuracy. 
Materials 
 100 of the 200 words used in experiment 1 were randomly selected to serve as the real 
word stimuli for experiment 2.  The remaining 100 were turned into nonwords by changing a 
single letter (randomly selected from the beginning, middle, and end of each word).  The 
splitting of the experiment 1 stimuli was done as to maximize the equivalence of the two groups 
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first on length (by randomly generating a hundred combinations of two groups with equivalent 
mean lengths), and then by minimizing the Mahalobis distance of a set of average variables, 
including bigram frequency, orthographic neighborhood, and word frequency, to maximize the 
similarities between the groups to ensure full lexical processing.  The practice items from 
experiment 1 were selected as practice items for experiment 2, half of which were changed to 
nonwords using the same procedure. 
 The 100 real words used in experiment 1, along with mean rated sociality, age of 
acquisition score, and concreteness score, can be found in Appendix C. 
Procedure 
 As in experiment 1, experiment 2 was conducted on the web using Java applets.  As in 
lab testing, subjects were presented instructions before testing, and were given an opportunity to 
practice, followed by feedback on their practice performance.  Subjects were encouraged to go as 
quickly and as accurately as possible. 
Participants were presented each word visually immediately following a fixation cross.  
Participants were asked to indicate words by pressing the “H” key on their keyboards using their 
right index fingers, and to indicate nonwords by pressing the “G” key on their keyboards using 
their left index fingers.   
Data Analysis 
 Data were analyzed at the trial level using mixed-effects linear models with both subjects 
and items as random factors.  For error analyses, models were fitted applying a binomial 
distribution to predict likelihood of a correct response. 
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Results 
 Analyses were restricted to real word trials.  All word trials (screened as described above) 
were used in accuracy analyses; only correct word trials were used in reaction time analyses, 
with 321 (4.86%) of word trials removed due to error. 
 Reaction time results are shown in Table 8.  Larger orthographic neighborhoods (p < 
.01), more letters (p < .05) and more animate referents (p < .05) were associated with 
significantly slower RTs; higher frequency (p < .05), more synonym sets (p < .01) and higher 
sociality (p < .001) were associated with significantly faster RTs (see Figure 1).  Notably, the 
most robust effect was associated with sociality, even after controlling for several other lexical 
variables.  More syllables and later acquisition were associated with marginally slower RTs (p < 
.10), and higher concreteness was associated with marginally faster RTs (p < .10). 
 Accuracy results are shown in Table 8 as well.  More synonym sets (p < .01), higher 
frequency (p < .01), higher bigram frequency (p < .05), and higher sociality (p < .05) were 
associated with better accuracy, while animacy was associated with poorer performance (p < .01) 
(see Figure 2).  Words with more morphemes and earlier acquisition were marginally associated 
with better performance (p < .10).    
Discussion 
 For rated sociality, the story is quite consistent: Visual lexical decision speed and 
accuracy are better for words rated as more likely as being used in a conversation about people 
than anything else.  This demonstrates that visual word recognition is sensitive to social 
information.  The next experiment looks at whether this effect is unique to reading or also 
extends to the auditory modality. 
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CHAPTER 5 EXPERIMENT 3 
Auditory Lexical Decision 
 To assess the generality of the sociality construct in word recognition, an auditory version 
of the lexical decision task was conducted.  Wurm (e.g., Wurm, Vakoch, Strasser, Calin-
Jageman, & Ross, 2001) has argued that the use of oral language as stimuli may uncover links 
between language processing and emotional aspects of meaning better than written words.  
Pinker (1994) conjectured that spoken language was used tens of thousands of years before 
written language in early humans, which may indicate that the processing of speech is more 
sensitive to evolutionarily- and behaviorally-relevant dimensions of meaning.  As with written 
words, spoken word recognition is dependent on a variety of factors.  Many of these factors are 
shared with written words, but a few are unique or different.  Auditory stimulus length is 
operationalized not by number of letters, but by number of phonemes.  Phonological 
neighborhoods are controlled for in lieu of orthographic neighborhoods.  Reaction times can be 
measured from stimulus onset, as in visual word recognition, but to reflect the unfolding of the 
stimulus over time, and that in the lexical decision task responses typically require a complete 
stimulus to have been presented to ensure accuracy – and that in the visual analog of this task 
such information was available to subjects at onset – the offset of stimuli were used in reaction 
time models. 
Participants 
 Seventy-seven undergraduate students from the Wayne State University psychology 
subject pool were recruited to participate.  All were native speakers of English.  Participants 
received extra credit in a psychology course for their participation. 
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 Of these 77 subjects, 26 were removed for not completing the task.  It is believed that this 
excessive number of drop-outs is due to technical difficulties involved with running an auditory 
Java experiment over the web.  Due to the non-universality of the sound implementation in many 
Java clients, the amount of data necessary for transfer to a client computer in an auditory task, 
and complications that go along with playing sound on a computer, a large number of subjects 
were unable to effectively run the experiment software.   
 Of the 51 remaining subjects, two were removed due to excessive error rates that 
approached chance, leaving 49 subjects who completed the task with above-chance accuracy.   
Of the remaining trials, 140 (~ 2%) were removed for having excessively long or short RTs 
(beyond two standard deviations from the mean).   
Materials 
 The words and non-words used in this study were those used in experiment 2.  A female 
speaker unfamiliar with the purpose of the experiment recorded the words at a normal speaking 
rate.  Words were recorded as 16 bit, 44,100 Hz PCM audio files, but converted to 8,000 Hz, 64 
kbps Sun AU files for Java applet compatibility.  This stripped each sound file of some of the 
audible high frequency spectrum in speech.  This yielded sub-optimal recordings; however, 
because of the exploratory nature of this project, and because of the general noisiness of spoken 
words in natural speech, I proceeded with the experiment using these stimuli.  
Procedure 
 As in the previous two experiments, subjects were tested on-line.  Instructions were the 
same as in experiment 2. 
Data Analysis 
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 RTs were measured from stimulus offset by subtracting stimulus duration from each 
response. 
Results 
 Error rates were much higher than in experiment 2 – even after removing subjects with 
very poor performance, the overall error rate was 7.5%. 
      Reaction time results are in Table 9.  Only frequency and age of acquisition predicted 
response latencies – more frequent words were associated with faster responses (p < .05) and 
later acquired words were associated with longer responses (p < .01).  While rated sociality’s 
coefficient was in the right direction (facilitative), its standard error led it to be far from 
significant (see Figure 3).   
 Accuracy results are also in Table 9.  In contrast to RTs, accuracy analyses were much 
more fruitful.  Words with more phonemes (p < .001), higher bigram frequency (p < .001), more 
syllables (p < .001), higher frequency (p < .05), concreteness (p < .001), and sociality (p < .01) 
were associated with higher accuracy, while animacy (p < .001) was associated with poorer 
accuracy (see Figure 4).   
Discussion 
 Although auditory lexical decision times collected were not very sensitive to the effects 
of lexical variables, accuracy was, fitting the general nature of the variables, and fitting the 
pattern observed thus far for rated sociality – better performance for words rated as more likely 
to be used in a conversation about people as opposed to a conversation about anything else. 
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CHAPTER 6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 This study achieved a number of firsts – the first word recognition study to investigate 
sociality; the first study to explicitly compare semantic ratings and a corpus-based semantic 
distance measure; the first word recognition study to investigate the importance of conversational 
context; and the first auditory word recognition study to be deployed on-line.   
The main effect of sociality 
 Sociality was significant or marginally significant in four out of four analyses involving 
visual lexical decision performance – more than any other variable in the study.  Sociality 
showed significance in auditory lexical decision accuracy (and showed a potential trend toward 
facilitating visual naming latencies) in the ELP data.  Only age of acquisition showed such 
robustness across all of these tasks.  Notably, age of acquisition is primarily a composite of other 
known lexical variables, in that the majority of its variance can be predicted using the set of other 
variables used in this study.  This is not true of rated sociality, most of which cannot be predicted 
by other known lexical variables.  This means that rated sociality contributes more independent 
predictive power to multimodal word recognition performance models than any other rated 
variable examined in this study.  I conclude that visual recognition is indeed sensitive to the 
likelihood of a word’s use in a conversation about people, independent of its form or other 
lexico-semantic variables, and there is evidence to suggest this effect applies to auditory 
processing as well and is perhaps not limited to the lexical decision task.   
Subject ratings, corpus-based semantic distance, and conversational context 
 Notably, a corpus-based semantic distance measure – the ratio between the distance 
between target words and a set of personal pronouns and the distance between target words and 
the pronoun “it” – managed to correlate significantly with subjective ratings of the likelihood of 
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words being used in conversations about people vs. the likelihood of words being used in 
conversations about anything else.  While the majority of variance in each variable was 
unexplained by the other, the fact that no other lexical variable correlated higher with either 
indicates a clear relationship.  This may indicate that more carefully controlled or informed uses 
of semantic distance measures as proxies for subjective ratings (which require time to acquire 
and can be contaminated with subject biases unrelated to the construct of interest) may be 
suitable for certain semantic variables in the future.  It also indicates that, as far as amorphous 
concepts such as “sociality” are concerned, a co-occurrence based conceptualization of semantics 
may not be entirely off track.  Indeed, as far as isolated word recognition goes, it appears that 
previous associated contexts do seem to matter – the kinds of conversations we previously found 
words in influences how they are recognized now. 
On-line Testing 
 All behavioral testing was done on-line, with mixed results.  Ratings and visual lexical 
decisions appeared quite good, with many lexical variables predicting visual lexical decision 
latencies and accuracy exactly as expected.  Auditory lexical decisions were not systematically 
related to the variables expected to predict performance, and this may have been due to an 
elevated error rate due to the low quality of the stimuli used or issues related to playing sounds 
remotely via the on-line client.  While this leads to compelling effects using accuracy as a 
dependent variable, it would be interesting to evaluate on-line testing using higher quality stimuli 
using a different platform to see if typical reaction time effects can be observed.   
Why sociality? 
 The next obvious question is: Why is the word recognition system sensitive to rated 
sociality?  The effects of more apparently evolutionarily relevant constructs such as danger and 
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usefulness are more readily interpreted: They speak to a general perceptual system that 
emphasizes behaviorally relevant stimuli.  But does that necessarily translate to language, in 
which words can and often do refer to things not present, and the immediacy of on-line 
processing is not a matter of life or death?  I turn to two foundational cognitive theorists to 
answer this question. 
 Notably, Lev Vygotsky posited the social function of language as core.  Vygotsky 
emphasized that language, as a part of a larger set of mental functions, was modeled after real 
relations between people. 
Initially, the sign is always a means of social connection, a means of affecting others … 
The original psychology of the function of the word is a social function, and if we want to 
trace how the word functions in the behavior of the individual, we must consider how it 
functioned formerly in the social behavior of people (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 103). 
This held not only for the function of language, but the level of the word itself, which carries 
meaning specifically because of and for social purposes.  Unlike other cognitive skills in our 
toolbox – memory, pattern recognition, decision-making – language is generally used in a social 
context.  When we hear words, they are (as far as current technological limits are concerned) 
almost always generated by people; when we read words, they are almost always generated by 
people.  It is, in most cases, impossible to perceive extraneously-produced language and not be 
engaged in a discourse, whether immediate or mediated, with another human, a social being.   
 While Vygotsky’s emphasis of the social in cognitive development has been criticized for 
its roots in Marxist theory, such has not been attributed to the author of noted contrasting 
theories of intellectual development, Jean Piaget.  While Piaget emphasized the individual in 
cognitive growth, this was not to the exclusion of the importance of social effects. 
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[T]here is no longer any need to choose between the primacy of the social or that of the 
intellect: collective intellect is the social equilibrium resulting from the interplay of the 
operations that enter into all cooperation (Piaget, 1970, p. 114).  
Notably Piaget flipped the role of the social in cognitive development: Engagement with society 
was the end-goal of cognitive development, indicating our language and reasoning systems grew 
to fit a social need.  To that end, language is shaped by and in turn serves social interactions.   
 In light of both theories, we recognize social words better because social words are of 
primary behavioral importance.  Intuitively, it simply means that words related to the task in 
which language is immersed demonstrate more relevance than words related to other things.  We 
recognize social words better because people are important whenever we are employed in 
language recognition.   
Possible mechanisms 
 I won’t speculate much on how this effect may be implemented in the word recognition 
system.  A possibility may be that word recognition networks are tuned to receive feedback – for 
the learning of new words or adjustment of old word meanings – that is generally linked to more 
social semantics, and these words are conferred a processing benefit.  Whether this influence is 
top-down or due to a preattentive filter is unknown, but given the notable independence of social 
effects from form-based effects, it seems that deeper semantic processing may be necessary, 
leading me to believe these effects are indeed top-down, from lexical semantics. 
 One issue with this study is that all of the sociality effects were observed in the lexical 
decision task.  While the intent was to observe a perceptual effect, post-perceptual contamination 
may have occurred.  By “perceptual,” I am using the general definition, as applied to word 
recognition, described by Wurm: 
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In the context of our research, perception is the involuntary, low-level process whereby a 
physical stimulus makes initial contact with a mental representation. From the point of 
view of perception researchers, the question of when variables have an influence is as 
important as whether they do. This leads us to the important distinction between 
processing that is truly perceptual (called “online” processing) and that which occurs 
post-perceptually. In general, an effect is considered online if the basic act of perceiving a 
stimulus (not interpreting it or making a judgement about it) is itself influenced … 
Variables that influence later decision processes (i.e. those that occur “higher up” in the 
system) are considered post-perceptual (Wurm et al. 2001, p. 411). 
While the lexical decision is used as an approximation of perceptual latencies, and it does span 
the act of stimulus acquisition and representation access, there is a necessary decision stage 
which can be best described as an executive function.  There are three possibilities: this stage 
adds a constant duration, more or less, to each lexical decision RT as far as sociality is 
concerned; sociality influences this stage of lexical decision performance and not the lexical 
access stage; sociality influences both.  While the lexical decision task suggests that sociality is 
perceptual – in that it very well may influence the process of accessing a lexical representation 
from an external stimulus – without observing its effect in a task not dependent upon executive 
functioning the possibility of it instead being a post-perceptual effect cannot be eliminated.  The 
naming task helps get around this issue, although post-perceptual biases can still be observed as 
delays or facilitations in initiating the speech response.  The delayed naming task (e.g., Wurm & 
Seaman, 2008) helps get around this by checking for a response bias after delaying pronunciation 
of the stimulus, and indeed this type of study should be carried out to confirm that sociality’s 
effects on the processing of speech are perceptual. 
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Future directions 
 Clearly, more research needs to be done multimodally and using more than the lexical 
decision task to demonstrate the universality of rated sociality effects in word recognition.  A 
lab-based auditory naming study that demonstrated social effects would accomplish this.  
Furthermore, this finding lends itself to neuroscience investigations.  If social processing at the 
semantic level resembles the processing of social-specific stimuli in other domains, there may be 
clear electrotemporal and hemodynamic patterns associated with social words not associated 
with other words.  For example, face processing in vision is associated with early (e.g., N200) 
evoked potential components in specific occipitotemporal regions (e.g., Allison, Puce, Spencer & 
McCarthy, 1999) and BOLD respond in the fusiform gyrus (e.g., Kanwisher, McDermott, & 
Chun, 1997) – nicknamed the face gyrus.  Similarly research into the auditory cortex has 
revealed distinctions between the processing of human and nonhuman sounds, with speech 
sounds, regardless of semantic content, more likely to be processed in the left ventral temporal 
and temporoparietal regions (e.g., Binder, Frost, Hammeke, Bellgowan, Springer, Kaufman, & 
Possing, 2000).  While these distinctions can be traced to differences in visual or acoustic 
energy, seeing such a person/non-person distinction at the level of lexical semantics would be 
both novel and would demonstrate a greater organizing principle of human perception and 
cognition. 
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APPENDIX A TABLES 
Table 1 – Bivariate Correlations Between Lexical Measures and a Sociality Ratio
WSRatio Length N LDRT NMGRT P-D NP-D AOA CNC SOC LogFreq
Written/Spoken 
Ratio 1
Length 0.49 1
N -0.38 -0.63 1
Lex Dec. RT 0.38 0.55 -0.32 1
Naming RT 0.39 0.52 -0.35 0.46 1
Person-Distance -0.70 -0.36 0.27 -0.22 -0.26 1
Non-Person-
Distance -0.68 -0.28 0.19 -0.19 -0.21 0.89 1
AoA 0.68 0.59 -0.45 0.55 0.53 -0.50 -0.38 1
Concreteness 0.22 -0.07 0.12 -0.24 -0.12
-0.24 -0.28
-0.25 -0.21
-0.37 -0.53 -0.53 1
Sociality Ratio -0.50 -0.38 0.31 0.76 0.45 -0.53 0.09 1
Log Frequency -0.71 -0.22 0.15 0.43 0.57 -0.14 -0.39 0.11 1
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Table 2 – Simultaneous Regression Model Using All Items and a Sociality Ratio
B St. Err. B B St. Err. B
Length 15.39 0.62 *** 10.22 0.5 ***
N 0.59 0.28 * -0.36 0.22
Log Freq. -6.66 0.79 *** -3.58 0.64 ***
Sociality Ratio -9.01 4.25 * -18.41 3.45 ***
Adjusted R 2  = 0.32 Adjusted R 2  = 0.28
df = 2684 df = 2684
* < .05; ** < 0.01; *** < .001; **** < .0001
Lexical Decision RTs Naming RTs
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Table 3 – Regression Model Using Items with Concreteness Scores and a Sociality Ratio
B St. Err. B B St. Err. B
Length 13.79 0.94 *** 10.46 0.81 ***
N 0.74 0.33 *** -0.37 0.23
Log Freq. -3.41 1.14 ** -3.05 0.98 **
Concreteness -0.12 0.013 *** -0.05 0.01 ***
Sociality Ratio -5.05 6.09 -12.09 5.23 *
Adjusted R 2  = 0.29 Adjusted R 2  = 0.28
df = 1161 df = 1161
* < .05; ** < 0.01; *** < .001; **** < .0001
Lexical Decision RTs Naming RTs
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Table 4 – Regression Model Using Items with AoA Scores and a Sociality Ratio
B St. Err. B B St. Err. B
Length 15.46 1.26 *** 9.35 1.13 ***
N 1.96 0.49 *** -0.25 0.45
Log Freq. -7.89 2.10 *** -4.60 1.89 *
Concreteness -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
AoA 0.15 0.03 *** 0.14 0.03 ***
Sociality Ratio 7.33 9.45 7.61 8.51
Adjusted R 2  = 0.46 Adjusted R 2  = 0.38
df = 524 df = 524
* < .05; ** < 0.01; *** < .001; **** < .0001
Lexical Decision RTs Naming RTs
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Table 6 - ELP Lexical Decision Peformance and Rated Sociality
B St. Err. B B St. Err. B
Length (letters) 16.03 2.66 *** 0.0018 0.0014
Orthographic N. 2.41 1.09 * 0.0006 0.0006
Synsets -2.26 1.30 . 0.0009 0.0007
AoA 0.10 0.05 . 0.0000 0.0000
Sociality -0.35 0.19 . 0.0005 0.0001 ***
Adjusted R 2  = 0.51 Adjusted R 2  = 0.09
df=205 df=205
. < .10; * < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001
RTs Accuracy
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Table 7 - ELP Naming Peformance and Rated Sociality
B St. Err. B
Length (letters) 11.45 2.38 ***
Synsets 2.08 1.16 .
AoA 0.10 0.05 *
Sociality -0.26 0.17
Adjusted R 2  = 0.44
df=205
. < .10; * < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001
RTs
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Table 8 - Lexical Decision Performance and Rated Sociality
B St. Err. B b B St. Err. B b
Length (letters) 9.05 4.35 * 0.33 0.010 0.060 . 0.01
Orthographic N. 4.01 1.53 ** 0.24 -0.001 0.021 0.00
Length (morph.) -1.26 10.40 -0.01 0.259 0.140 . 0.08
Bigram Freq. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.0002 0.0001 * 0.06
Length (syll.) 16.94 9.35 . 0.26 -0.099 0.132 -0.05
Log Freq. -14.77 6.12 * -0.14 0.244 0.079 ** 0.07
Age of Acq. 0.14 0.08 . 0.21 -0.002 0.001 . -0.09
Synsets -6.40 2.05 ** -0.27 0.090 0.029 ** 0.09
Concreteness -0.10 0.06 . -0.16 0.000 0.001 0.00
Sociality -1.09 0.31 *** -0.30 0.009 0.004 * 0.08
Anim. (level 1) 36.34 16.27 * -0.608 0.212 **
Anim. (level 2) 17.55 20.04 0.088 0.284
. < .10; * < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001
RTs Accuracy
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Table 9 - Auditory Lexical Decision Performance and Rated Sociality
B St. Err. B b B St. Err. B b
Length (phon.) 13.81 1.44 0.28 0.304 0.076 *** 0.17
Phonol. N. 1.53 0.98 0.13 -0.004 0.010 -0.01
Length (morph.) -26.49 -1.31 -0.17 0.048 0.160 0.01
Bigram Freq. 0.02 1.50 0.12 0.0004 0.0001 *** 0.07
Length (syll.) -36.00 -1.72 -0.35 0.662 0.160 *** 0.17
Log Freq. -16.40 -1.87 * -0.10 0.128 0.059 * 0.02
Age of Acq. 0.49 2.91 ** 0.48 -0.001 0.001 -0.02
Synsets -0.52 -0.13 -0.12 -0.016 0.026 -0
Concreteness -0.06 -0.44 -0.06 0.004 0.001 *** 0.11
Sociality -0.34 -0.53 -0.06 0.011 0.004 ** 0.05
Anim. (level 1) -31.06 -0.94 -0.924 0.263 ***
Anim. (level 2) -8.59 -0.21 0.064 0.272
. < .10; * < .05; ** < .01; *** < .001
RTs Accuracy
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Figure 1. The effects of 10 lexico-semantic variables on visual lexical decision reaction time 
(ms).  OrthoN = orthographic neighborhood; NMorph = number of morphemes; BGSum = 
bigram frequency; NSyll = number of syllables; log(freqW) = log of written frequency; AOA = 
age of acquisition; synsets = number of senses; CNC = concreteness; soc = sociality. 
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Figure 2. The effects of 10 lexico-semantic variables on visual lexical decision accuracy. OrthoN 
= orthographic neighborhood; NMorph = number of morphemes; BGSum = bigram frequency; 
NSyll = number of syllables; log(freqW) = log of written frequency; AOA = age of acquisition; 
synsets = number of senses; CNC = concreteness; soc = sociality. 
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Figure 3. The effects of 10 lexico-semantic variables on auditory lexical decision reaction times 
(ms). NPhon = number of phonemes; PhonoN = orthographic neighborhood; NMorph = number 
of morphemes; BGSum = bigram frequency; NSyll = number of syllables; log(freqW) = log of 
spoken frequency; AOA = age of acquisition; synsets = number of senses; CNC = concreteness; 
soc = sociality. 
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Figure 4. The effects of 10 lexico-semantic variables on auditory lexical decision accuracy. 
NPhon = number of phonemes; PhonoN = orthographic neighborhood; NMorph = number of 
morphemes; BGSum = bigram frequency; NSyll = number of syllables; log(freqW) = log of 
spoken frequency; AOA = age of acquisition; synsets = number of senses; CNC = concreteness; 
soc = sociality. 
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Word Sociality 
Rating 
Age of 
Acq. 
Score 
Cncrtness 
Score 
    
administration 45.1 561 331 
angel 41.1 242 399 
anybody 60.1 306 343 
area 10.5 392 384 
army 51.0 317 543 
article 10.3 406 479 
aspect 14.1 547 217 
attitude 52.2 481 265 
avenue 4.4 372 539 
ball 6.9 150 615 
bird 2.1 206 602 
blood 44.3 253 613 
brain 49.8 347 556 
business 26.9 436 389 
car 20.2 197 622 
century 9.8 414 346 
character 50.9 464 365 
circuit 6.8 494 493 
coffee 28.5 292 613 
column 3.0 436 520 
committee 50.5 517 498 
community 53.4 522 388 
compression 6.7 628 356 
Word Sociality 
Rating 
Age of 
Acq. 
Score 
Cncrtness 
Score 
    
corporation 30.1 522 361 
crime 47.3 383 387 
customer 60.3 369 505 
department 20.9 494 447 
description 20.7 469 341 
direction 18.3 381 336 
door 5.2 214 606 
education 45.1 408 320 
effort 38.3 411 296 
enemy 53.0 367 434 
equipment 6.8 447 532 
evidence 19.8 480 340 
failure 36.0 439 282 
fee 10.4 444 441 
gas 13.9 339 554 
generation 47.1 489 320 
girl 69.5 183 607 
goal 34.5 294 482 
government 43.5 453 426 
growth 36.6 378 381 
hall 6.6 283 565 
income 41.8 506 429 
industry 18.2 492 479 
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Word Sociality 
Rating 
Age of 
Acq. 
Score 
Cncrtness 
Score 
    
instance 12.0 471 284 
introduction 15.8 481 341 
item 9.8 406 436 
journal 24.0 447 563 
justice 40.0 500 307 
lady 68.7 231 564 
length 3.8 322 365 
letter 23.1 256 577 
literature 29.8 494 462 
liver 41.3 353 617 
loss 25.6 331 313 
marriage 65.4 383 398 
moment 21.7 350 301 
money 35.7 247 574 
mountain 0.0 283 616 
mouse 5.6 242 624 
music 31.8 272 512 
nature 14.4 342 414 
organ 51.1 356 596 
package 6.5 364 580 
personnel 43.9 575 429 
philosophy 30.3 622 257 
platform 8.4 386 547 
population 53.4 469 406 
presence 28.5 456 326 
Word Sociality 
Rating 
Age of 
Acq. 
Score 
Cncrtness 
Score 
    
president 65.6 458 526 
professor 64.2 519 549 
protection 37.5 461 308 
ray 8.8 322 470 
reaction 36.3 506 312 
resolution 24.2 550 265 
responsibility 49.0 514 222 
road 7.3 206 583 
self 65.7 328 459 
series 7.2 461 373 
situation 34.9 457 311 
society 51.7 497 335 
solution 20.5 506 388 
speech 52.6 369 453 
spirit 38.3 389 296 
statement 22.2 481 379 
suggestion 36.6 461 333 
suspect 50.1 472 379 
sword 8.0 342 577 
teacher 61.6 247 569 
text 24.4 486 498 
theory 22.0 557 287 
title 15.9 375 384 
translation 23.5 556 366 
union 37.6 503 449 
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Word Sociality 
Rating 
Age of 
Acq. 
Score 
Cncrtness 
Score 
    
unit 11.7 411 389 
van 8.6 267 606 
vice 21.8 517 399 
weapon 12.5 375 560 
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 While research into the role of semantic structure in the recognition of written and spoken 
words has grown, it has not looked specifically at the role of conversational context on the 
recognition of isolated words.  This study was a corpus-based and behavioral exploration of a 
new semantic variable – sociality – and used on-line behavioral testing to obtain new word 
recognition data using the visual and auditory lexical decision tasks.  The results consistently 
demonstrated that sociality is one of the most robust predictors of lexical decision performance.  
Overall, it appears that the visual lexical decision task is quite sensitive to the likelihood of 
words being used in conversations about people, and there is evidence suggesting this effect is 
multimodal and may extend beyond lexical decision. 
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